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Non-technical summary 
 
In many industrialised countries the demographic chance makes a better use of the labour 
force highly desirable. However, attempts to enact market orientated labour market reforms 
are regularly confronted with significant political resistance. This paper aims to contribute to 
a better understanding of the drivers of labour market reform acceptance at the individual 
level in Germany. Based on our theoretical considerations, we propose an analytical 
framework distinguishing between self-interest, information, fairness judgements and 
economic beliefs as well as other individual factors (e.g. socialisation in the former German 
Democratic Republic).  
 
To test this framework empirically we use data from the representative German General 
Social Survey (ALLBUS) for the years 2000 and 2006. Next to information about the 
respondents’ assessment of several market-oriented reform policies (e.g. benefit cuts, longer 
working years, cutting subsidies to declining industries, phasing out employment programmes 
or a liberalisation of employment protection), this survey offers data on individual fairness 
assessment as well as objective data on the respondents’ socio economic characteristics.  
 
The results indicate that self-interest (e.g. related to the respondents’ income or employment 
status) is a major determinant for individual assessment of labour market reforms. 
Nevertheless, self-interest is not the full story behind the strong resistance against labour 
market reforms. The individuals’ labour market policy preferences are also influenced by their 
informative situation, by their beliefs on the sources of economic success or the function of 
the democratic system. In addition, we found Eastern Germans to be more sceptical of liberal 
labour market reforms than their western fellow citizens. Our findings are relevant for a 
successfully selling of market-oriented labour-market reforms: It is not sufficient to point to 
the individual advantages of a reform, other fairness-oriented sources of reform resistance 
need to be addressed as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
In vielen Industrieländern ist zwar angesichts des demografischen Wandels eine bessere 
Nutzung des Arbeitskräftepotenzials wünschenswert, marktorientierte Arbeitsmarktreformen 
treffen jedoch regelmäßig auf deutlichen politischen Widerstand. Die vorliegende Arbeit soll 
zu einem besseren Verständnis der Akzeptanz von Arbeitsmarktreformen auf der 
individuellen Ebene in Deutschland beitragen. Theoretische Überlegungen legen eine 
Unterscheidung zwischen Eigeninteressen, Informationsstand, individuellen 
Gerechtigkeitsurteilen und Einschätzungen bezüglich der Ursachen für wirtschaftlichen 
Erfolg sowie anderen individuellen Faktoren (z. B. Sozialisierung in der ehemaligen DDR) 
nahe.  
 
Die empirischen Analysen basieren auf repräsentativen Umfragedaten für Deutschland, die im 
Rahmen der Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS) in den 
Jahren 2000 und 2006 erhoben wurden. Neben Informationen über die Einschätzung diverser 
marktorientierter Reformmaßnahmen durch die Teilnehmer (z. B. Kürzung von 
Sozialleistungen, Verlängerung der Lebensarbeitszeit, Kürzung von Subventionen für 
schwache Industrien, Abschaffung von Beschäftigungsprogrammen oder Liberalisierung des 
Kündigungsschutzes) sind auch eine Vielzahl weiterer individueller Werturteile und 
Einschätzungen sowie objektive Daten zur sozioökonomischen Lage der Befragten enthalten.  
 
Die Ergebnisse unserer empirischen Analyse zeigen, dass Eigeninteressen zwar die 
individuelle Beurteilung von Arbeitsmarktreformen maßgeblich beeinflussen, aber den 
starken Widerstand gegen diese nicht vollständig erklären können. Vielmehr beeinflussen 
auch der Informationsstand, die Einschätzungen zur individuellen Eigenverantwortlichkeit 
und der Funktionsfähigkeit des demokratischen Systems die individuellen Präferenzen für 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Darüber hinaus stehen ostdeutsche Bürger Reformen, die eine stärkere 
Liberalisierung der Arbeitsmärkte zum Ziel haben, skeptischer gegenüber als ihre 
westdeutschen Mitbürger. Unsere Erkenntnisse könnten unter anderem für die erfolgreiche 
Präsentation von marktorientierten Arbeitsmarktreformen von Bedeutung sein: 
Möglicherweise reicht es nicht aus, die individuellen Vorteile durch die Reform zu betonen, 
andere fairness-orientierte Ursachen für Reformwiderstand müssen ebenso berücksichtigt 
werden. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Highly regulated labour markets remain a challenge for industrial countries like Germany, 
France or Italy. While demographic change makes a better use of the labour force highly 
desirable, existing labour market institutions still entail obstacles and disincentives for 
employment. At the same time, attempts to enact market oriented labour market reforms are 
regularly confronted with significant political resistance. The German experience in recent 
years gives an example for the political problems of increasing labour market flexibility: 
Although many of the underlying problems of German labour market had been well known by 
experts for years, the “Hartz reforms” have only been possible after a dramatic increase of 
unemployment. And even though these reforms are regarded to contribute to a falling 
unemployment (Franz, 2006), they remain politically contentious. 
In recent years, the contrast between reform needs and observable reform activities - which is 
not confined to labour market policy - has attracted increasing academic attention. A first 
strand of the relevant literature explores survey data for typical differences between expert 
and lay perceptions of economic phenomena and also takes account of psychological insights 
(Baron and Kemp, 2004; Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2002). A second literature is based on 
cross-country comparisons and scrutinizes the country or time specific factors which foster or 
block reforms (for a survey see chapter 4 in Heinemann et al., 2008). From the latter literature 
a specific insight emerges with respect to labour market reforms: Unlike reforms of financial 
market, product markets or foreign trade, no overall trend of market friendly reforms has been 
detected for labour markets in industrial countries over recent decades. On this field, 
regulation indicators often stay constant or even increase (Helbling et al., 2004). This 
persistence of regulation makes it desirable to widen our understanding for the individual 
factors which shape the support for interventionist labour market institutions and policies. 
Here our contribution comes in: Based on survey data we explore the drivers of labour market 
reform acceptance on the individual level. 
Comparable studies have been undertaken for pension reforms (Boeri et al., 2002; Boeri and 
Tabellini, 2007) indicating that, besides self-interest, information and problem awareness is 
among the major driver of reform acceptance. An important point of reference is the literature 
on the political economy of labour market regulation starting with the insider-outsider-theory 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) and advanced in recent years by contributions such as Saint-
Paul (2000), Boeri et al. (2004) and Neugart (2008). These authors are particularly interested 
to understand the relative political attractiveness of unemployment benefits versus 
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employment protection, given that cross-country evidence indicates substitutability of 
generous unemployment benefits and rigid employment protection rules. Both Saint-Paul 
(2000) and Boeri et al. (2004) stress the importance of individual skill levels whereas Neugart 
(2008) draws the attention to the role of voters without labour market activity who depend on 
within household transfers. 
While these labour economics approaches focus on self-interest as an explanation for sticky 
labour market institutions our approach allows for additional dimensions such as fairness 
preferences or the role of economic beliefs. Our results are based on the German General 
Social Survey “ALLBUS” which includes questions closely related to labour market policy 
preferences. These findings indicate that the wider perspective beyond mere self-interest has 
empirical substance. Although variables approximating self-interest play a crucial role, other 
dimensions contribute substantially to our understanding of individual heterogeneity in reform 
acceptance: Proxies for the degree of information, distributive preferences and beliefs on the 
sources of economic success prove significant. Furthermore, our results confirm that the 
divided history of Germany is important for understanding the heterogeneity of labour market 
policy preferences. Thus, the finding from Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) that Germans 
socialized under communism show a stronger preference for state interventions holds for 
labour market policy.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we present the database and our indicators of 
labour market reform preferences. Section 3 is devoted to the identification of potential 
factors that explain why individuals differ in their views on labour market reforms. We 
present our econometric results (section 4) and present some policy conclusions in section 5. 
 
2. The database and its policy preference indicators 
The German General Social Survey “ALLBUS” has been conducted biannually since 1980 
and is designed to be representative for the German population.1 Next to information on the 
respondents’ assessment of several policies, ALLBUS offers data on the individual labour 
market status, socio-economic situation as well as on crucial economic beliefs and fairness 
preferences. In this study, we focus on data collected in the years 2000 and 2006. The latter 
wave is a particularly valuable source for the assessment of labour market policies as it 
 
1  For details on ALLBUS see http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/allbus. 
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contains questions defined in the context of the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP). The questions related to the ISSP’s modules “Work Orientation III” and “Role of 
Government IV” include items highly relevant for the acceptance of labour market reforms.2 
Although the content of the year 2000 ALLBUS wave is less specific on labour markets, it is 
included since it offers questions on acceptance of social benefit cuts in general and on 
redistributive preferences.  
This combined dataset contains the following items which function as our indicators for the 
individual preferences on labour market reforms and as dependent variables in the subsequent 
regressions.3 Two questions ask for the acceptance of benefit cuts: the one from the year 2000 
wave refers to “social benefits” in general, whereas the 2006 wave focuses more specifically 
on the acceptance of cutting “unemployment benefits”. Preferences on the retirement age are 
captured by a wave 2006 question asking whether increasing the pension age is acceptable to 
solve the problems of the public pension system. Two further questions from the 2006 dataset 
are linked to the assessment of interventionist labour market policy, i.e. the support for 
“subsidies to declining industries” and “public employment programmes”. Finally, one 
question from the later wave refers to employment protection and asks for the willingness to 
accept terminable contracts in order to avoid unemployment. It has to be stressed that this 
latter question is distinct from the others insofar as it does not ask for the assessment of a 
political approach but for individual behaviour. Lacking an alternative measure for the vividly 
debated point of employment protection, we include it in our analysis. However, analytical 
results based on this question must be interpreted with caution.  
From the point of view of economic experts, the mentioned questions obviously lack 
precision. Survey respondents can have very different ideas on the particular design of 
“employment programmes” or “subsidies to declining industries”. Also the questions on 
cutting (unemployment) benefits are far from precise with respect to the specificities of a 
reform which includes benefit cuts. In spite of these limitations, the answers nevertheless 
reveal the individual’s tendency to support or reject market-oriented reforms which are based 
on a less generous welfare state, longer working years and less government interventions. 
 
2  ALLBUS respondents participate either in the module “Work Orientation III” or “Role of Government 
IV”, thus data from both modules can only be used separately. This limitation precludes the construction of 
aggregate indicators or reform acceptance summarizing individual positions over all policy issues.  
3  A detailed description of our variables is offered in Table 4 in the appendix.  
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To facilitate the interpretation, all policy preference indicators have been recoded into binary 
variables that are equal to one if the respondent is in favour of liberal reform approaches (i.e. 
preferring a cut of benefits, accepting longer working years, supporting a cut of subsidies and 
employment programmes and accepting lower standards of employment protection) and zero 
otherwise.    
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The descriptive statistics (Table 1) of our policy preference indicators reveal that the opinions 
of (economic) experts are far from popular among the German population. The vast majority 
supports interventionist labour market policies and is sceptical on cutting benefits. The 
average acceptance of liberalising reforms ranges only between 16 (phasing out of 
employment programmes) and 27 percent (increasing the pension age). The only exception is 
the acceptance of terminable contracts which is supported by 72 percent. However, the 
mentioned character of the underlying survey question indicates that this supportive view 
reflects individual flexibility rather than policy preferences. Note that the rejection rates for 
cutting social benefits in the year 2000 wave and for cutting unemployment benefits in the 
year 2006 wave are almost the same. This is remarkable given that in between both years 
substantial labour market reforms have reduced the generosity of the system.  
 
3. Potential impact factors 
Very different factors may explain why individuals diverge in their views on labour market 
reforms. First, self-interest is likely to play a central role, since individuals are affected 
differently by reforms depending on their economic situation. Second, they have different 
levels of economically relevant information and entertain diverging economic beliefs, e.g., on 
the role of incentives. Both could lead them to different conclusions concerning the 
effectiveness of labour market reforms. Third, reforms may be judged from a fairness 
perspective with different ideas of fairness leading to different views on reforms. In this 
section, we discuss how different proxies for these three (and some other) factors should 
influence labour market reform acceptance. We pay particular attention to those six reform 
issues which are covered by the ALLBUS survey. 
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Self-interest  
The idea that self-interest drives both the support for and resistance against labour market 
reforms is the central creed of the political-economic view at labour market institutions. 
According to a highly influential view (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988), insiders (the employed) 
have an interest in labour market regulation shielding them against wage competition by 
outsiders (the unemployed). This theory can explain why democracies opt for employment 
protection even at the costs of raising structural unemployment as long as the median voter is 
an insider. Saint-Paul (2000) advances this basic idea further to explain the stability of rigid 
labour market institutions. He shows that unskilled workers may demand employment 
protection at the costs of skilled labour and the unemployed. Boeri et al. (2004) suggests that 
low skilled tend to favour employment protection relative to unemployment benefits and that 
this holds in particular for countries with a compressed wage structure. Neugart (2008) 
proposes that voters who are not part of the labour force and depend on transfers from a wage 
earner within their household are particularly supportive for employment protection (relative 
to unemployment benefits). These insights are helpful to identify individual characteristics 
which approximate self-interest in the formation of labour market policy preferences.4 
The appropriate identification of self-interest will differ depending on which specific aspect 
of labour market institutions is at stake. With respect to the level of unemployment benefits 
we would clearly expect that unemployed or those with a particular exposure to job risk have 
an interest in a comfortable level. Employment risk is related to both job characteristics, e.g. 
private as opposed to public sector employment, and individual risk factors such as low 
qualification. Hence, all these factors should be negatively correlated with the support for 
reforms implying the cut in benefits. 
Whereas the unemployed and the employed with a significant unemployment risk are united 
in their preference for high benefits, the insider-outsider theory predicts that both groups 
differ in their self-interest vis-à-vis measures which protect existing jobs. These measures are 
 
4   Due to conceptual and data reasons our analytical approach is different to that of Boeri et al. 
(2004) and Neugart (2008), who study the relative support of employment protection versus unemployment 
benefits. Conceptually, we are keen to understand the heterogeneity of views at a much wider range of labour 
market policy issues including active labour market policies. Apart from that, data limitations preclude a direct 
comparison of employment protection and unemployment benefit preferences for individuals since our 
preference proxies for these two reform dimensions originate from non-overlapping subsamples of the 2006 
ALLBUS data (see Appendix, Table 4). 
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not confined to installing employment protection rules but also include market interventions, 
e.g., through subsidies for declining industries. Because the unemployed do not benefit from 
this kind of initiatives, we expect support to be confined to those workers whose current job is 
at risk. Public employment programs are less exclusively targeted at job insiders. Therefore, 
they should be welcome by unemployed and employees alike as long as the latter’s job is 
endangered. With respect to pension age, we expect unemployed or people with a significant 
risk of unemployment to oppose an increase in pension age since this prolongs the (potential) 
dependency on unemployment transfers.  
For a number of reasons, the individual income shapes the self-interest in labour market 
reforms. First, income is a proxy for qualification which in turn signals job security since 
unemployment threatens workers with low qualification far above proportion. Second, with 
increasing income interventionist labour market policies lose their attraction because they 
become increasingly expensive from the individual perspective due to increasing 
contributions and taxes. Though unemployment benefits increase with former income in the 
German benefit system (at least up to the contribution ceiling), this effect does not outweigh 
the two factors named above. Hence, the higher the income the more likely it is that the 
individual is a net payer to the welfare state. Both effects imply the same sign prediction: 
High income individuals should be supportive for liberalisation and benefit cuts while 
opposing expensive subsidies or public employment programs. Due to the link between 
income and job security as well as between income and job satisfaction we expect high 
income individuals to support an increase of the pension age (which is indeed the fact for 
Italians and Germans, see Boeri et al., 2002). 
Like income, age co-determines the self-interest in labour market reforms through a number 
of channels. First, older members of the workforce tend to face a lower chance of re-
employment if they become unemployed. Thus, they should be more supportive of 
employment protection, high unemployment benefit, subsidies for declining industries and 
public employment programs. As people beyond pension age do not have a strong self-
interest in these issues, this impact of age can only be expected for respondents in working 
age. The impact of age on reform acceptance is more complicated when it comes to the issue 
of pension age. Current pensioners are expected to welcome the increase of the pension age 
since this stabilizes the level of current and future pension payments. The effect of age among 
people below retirement age largely depends on the speed with which the new pension age 
applies to different cohorts. In case of a sudden increase in the pension age for all cohorts, we 
expect the younger to be more supportive than the older employees because the former benefit 
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from lower contribution rates while the latter would only have costs. Indeed, this is what 
Boeri et al. (2002) find on the basis of a survey conducted in Italy and Germany. Given that 
age is a proxy for the risk of unemployment, there is thus a double argument that older 
workers (as compared to both younger workers and pensioners) should be particularly 
opposed to an increase of pension age: The increase makes job loss more expensive and 
produces an unfavourable cost-benefit-balance for this age group. 5  
The ALLBUS database allows us to control for unemployment, the subjective judgement on 
the individual unemployment risk, employment in the public sector, respectively (see Table 4 
for precise data definitions and sources). Beside income we also make use of an entrepreneur 
dummy since entrepreneurs are supposed to be net-contributors to the welfare state. In order 
to account for the possible non-linear relation between age and the acceptance of public 
pension reform, we introduce dummy-variables for three different age-groups (under 25, 25 to 
45 and 45 to 65 years old) with the age-group above 65 being the point of reference. 
 
Information and economic beliefs 
Information has an impact in the context of economic policy and policy reform debates. In 
their analysis of Italian survey data, Boeri and Tabellini (2007) find that respondents who are 
more informed about the costs and functioning of the pension system are more willing to 
accept reforms. We expect a similar impact of information also in the context of market-
oriented labour market reforms as well-informed and well-educated people should have at 
least a rough understanding of the functioning of labour markets.  
Given that information is generally far from complete, we expect individuals to differ in their 
economic beliefs. With respect to labour market policies, the belief concerning the impact of 
incentives on economic effort and the belief concerning the impact of industriousness on 
economic outcomes are relevant (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Faravelli, 2007; Bischoff 
et al., 2008). The belief that individuals are responsible for their own economic situation 
should lead to a more favourable assessment of reforms targeted at fostering job search 
 
5   Note that the German pension reform implements the increase in pension age from age 65 to 
age 67 gradually: Only cohorts born after 1947 are affected at all and the final legal pension age of 67 only 
applies to those born 1964 or later. All cohorts in between expect an increase in pension age between 0 and 24 
months. If survey respondents had this specific scheme in mind, this should increase the support of older workers 
who are hardly affected by the higher pension age. 
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incentives such as cuts in employment benefits. Similarly, interventionist policies like 
subsidies for declining industries or employment programmes should be less popular among 
people who share these beliefs. In addition, the beliefs on economic self-responsibility should 
be correlated with an acceptance of a higher pension age.   
We make use of two variables to proxy the respondents’ degree of information about the 
consequences of labour market policy reforms in the ALLBUS dataset: First, we control for 
education achievements through a dummy for a university degree. Note that this variable is a 
combined factor approximating not only information but also income prospects and job 
market risk. Second, the participants’ self-assessment concerning their degree of political 
information is used. The respondents’ beliefs concerning the impact of effort and 
industriousness on economic success are captured as follows: A dummy-variable indicates 
that respondents believe that income differences increase the incentive for individual effort 
(ALLBUS 2000) and that “the future of the people in the East depends on their will to work” 
(ALLBUS 2006), respectively. For ALLBUS 2000 we also use respondents’ belief that social 
background determines individual success. 
 
Fairness aspects 
Labour market policies are an integrative part of welfare state policies. Hence, preferences on 
redistribution are likely to partially shape the assessment of labour market reforms. An 
individual whose concept of fairness is dominated by the need principle (i.e. income 
distribution should reflect individual needs) will have different reform preferences than 
people whose concept of fairness is dominated by the equity principle (i.e. income 
distribution should reflect individual effort, see e.g., Fong, 2001, Konow, 2001; 2003). The 
first-named individual should be more supportive of high unemployment benefits, 
interventionist labour market approaches and less supportive of an increase in pension age. 
The opposite can be expected for persons following the equity principle.  
Next to fairness preferences, beliefs on the procedural fairness of the political system may 
influence policy (reform) preferences. Following the concept of procedural fairness, the 
question of whether a certain outcome is considered fair crucially depends on the procedure 
through which it has been generated. Decisions are considered procedurally fair if every 
person potentially affected by them is given the chance to voice his opinion and concern. 
Neutrality demands that decision-makers are able to separate from self-interest. In addition, 
fair procedures have to be transparent and consistent (e.g., Anand, 2001; Dolan et al.; 2007). 
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We do not have a clear sign prediction for the impact of the procedural beliefs on labour 
market reform acceptance because the perception of a fair political procedures could 
legitimize both the existing institutions (e.g., the current level of benefits) and its reforms 
(e.g., cutting these benefits). 
ALLBUS 2000 offers the question whether the respondent prefers a distributive outcome that 
guarantees a “decent income even without achievement” which we use as a proxy for 
preferences for distributional fairness according to the need principle. The assessment 
whether politicians are interested in the problems of the common people is used as an 
indicator for the respondents’ beliefs about procedural fairness (ALLBUS 2006). For 
ALLBUS 2000 we exploit information on the participants’ beliefs concerning the functioning 
of the democratic system in Germany.  
 
Personal characteristics including socialisation under communism 
A number of personal characteristics are likely to go along with specific preferences for 
labour market reforms. Some of these personal characteristics capture specific aspects of self-
interest, information, beliefs or fairness assessments that cannot be observed directly. In 
addition, however, personal characteristics account for new aspects.  
It is by now an established empirical fact that the history of communism has left its marks in 
behaviour and social preferences of Germans who were socialised under that regime. Alesina 
and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that, compared to their Western German countrymen, 
Eastern Germans have a stronger preference for redistribution that cannot fully be explained 
by self-interest and the simple fact that Eastern Germans are relatively poor. Bischoff et al. 
(2008) show that Eastern Germans judge the existing social differences in their country to be 
less fair than their western fellow citizens. Following these insights a specific “GDR effect” 
may also have an impact on reform preferences even if our study design allows for the control 
of income or job risk. We thus expect that socialisation under Communism implies a stronger 
preference for interventionist labour market policies and welfare state generosity.  
Religiosity is another personal characteristic of potential importance. Religious people are 
more likely to believe that it is one’s duty to be industrious in the here and now (e.g., 
Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Tan, 2006). This may lead them to be sceptical on generous 
support for the unemployed or activist employment policies. On the other hand, they are 
likely to exhibit a stronger sensitivity for inequality and other social problems (e.g., Tan, 
 11
2006). The net effect of religiosity on the assessment of labour market reforms is thus 
undetermined.  
A complete research design has to take account of gender since the literature reports that 
women have a stronger preference for income redistribution be it through government policy 
or charity (e.g., Piper and Schnepf, 2008; Corneo and Gruener, 2002; Delaney and O’Toole, 
2008). In addition, a gender gap is reported for beliefs (e.g., Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; 
Fong, 2001), risk-aversion (e.g., Meier-Pesti and Penz, 2008) and the sensitivity to inequality 
(e.g., Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001): Compared to males, females are more risk-averse and 
more sensitive to inequality. Therefore, they should be more supportive for a generous 
unemployment support and interventionist labour market policies. No prediction is made for 
their preferences on an increasing pension age.  
Based on the reasoning of Neugart (2008) on the role of intra-household transfers for the 
support of labour market regulation the household composition could matter for the reform 
readiness: The presumption is that households with members not active on the labour market 
are particularly interested into the job protection of the household’s wage earner.  
Again, the ALLBUS dataset offers useful indicators to control for the mentioned impact 
factors: The impact of socialisation under a communist regime is captured by a dummy which 
is equal to one if the respondent has either been born (ALLBUS 2000) or spent his youth in 
the former German Democratic Republic (ALLBUS 2006). Religiosity is assessed by 
membership in an institutionalized religious community. For the subset originating from the 
ISSP “Work Orientation III” module, a question on readiness to work even without needing 
the money is available as a proxy for intrinsic work motivation. Besides gender we also make 
use of the marital status and dummy for children to cover phenomena of within household 
transfer dependency. Finally, the individual’s self-reported state of health is included which 
we expect to be of particular importance for the view on increasing the pension age. Table 2 
summarises the signs of the expected effects on the different dimensions of labour market 
reform issues. 
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Table 2: Expected signs 
  Support for (+) / resistance against (-) … 
 Cutting 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Increase of 
pension age 
Cutting 
subsidies to 
declining 
industries 
Phasing out 
employment 
programmes 
Liberalising 
employment 
protection 
Unemployed - - + - + 
Job risk - - - - - 
Income + + + + + 
Age* - - - - - 
Information + + + + + 
Support for 
need 
principle of 
distribution 
- - - - - 
Belief: self-
responsibility 
+ + + + + 
Belief: 
functioning 
democracy 
? ? ? ? ? 
Eastern 
Germany 
- - - - - 
Religious ? ? ? ? ? 
Female - ? - - - 
Household 
size 
? ? - - - 
* Sign of expected age effect is limited to individuals in employment age. 
 
4. Econometric Results 
Table 3 displays the results of six probit regressions of our policy preference indicators on the 
set of explanatory variables as described above. We analyse the individual acceptance of 
reforms concerning preferences on benefits in regressions (1) and (2), pension age in (3), 
interventionist labour market policies in (4) and (5) and employment protection in (6). The 
slight differences in the inclusion of control variables are caused by the differing availability 
of indicators in the employed ALLBUS subsets or our theoretical reasoning as relating to the 
pension age (2) where differentiated age variables are used to allow for possible non-
linearities as discussed above.6  
                                                 
6  Furthermore, we allowed for general non-linearities for the variables age and income by including also 
a squared term. The results do not indicate a general non-linear relationship (obtainable from the authors). 
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A first overall insight from the regressions is that individual labour market reform preferences 
are clearly shaped by self-interest. Among the self-interest proxy, income performs robustly 
in line with the theoretical expectations: A larger income is associated with a stronger support 
for market oriented reforms; only in the case of employment protection preferences the 
coefficient misses significance.7 Unemployment increases the resistance against cuts in 
payments strongly with sizeable marginal effects. Similarly, we find the perception of a high 
unemployment risk to significantly foster the resistance against unemployment benefit cuts. 
These results indicate that pecuniary interests are a major impact factor for individual labour 
market reform preferences. We only find limited support for the insider-outsider-theory: As 
explained in section 2, the asymmetry of interests between insiders and outsiders should shine 
up in diverging preferences for subsidies to declining industries which benefit the protected 
employees but not the unemployed. Although the unemployment dummy has the expected 
sign in regression (4), it misses significance.8 Entrepreneurship has no significant impact, 
while public sector employment reveals the unexpected result of a stronger resistance against 
cuts of social benefits, cuts of subsidies and the increase of the pension age. While the latter 
results could be the consequence of higher pensions in the public sector which make late 
retirement even less attractive, the former may mirror bureaucratic self-interest into a large 
welfare state. Age has the expected negative and significant sign on the acceptance of cutting 
unemployment benefits and the liberalisation of employment protection. The non-linear effect 
of age on the views on a higher pension age is in line with expectations: The age groups 
between 25 and 65 are more critical of an increase than people in pension age (who are not hit 
by a higher pension age). In line with our considerations in section 2, we find no significant 
difference between the preferences of pensioners and respondents’ younger than 25 as the 
latter should expect to gain from lower contributions during their working life. Note that our 
result with respect to the reform friendly younger generation is in line with those of Boeri et 
al. (2002) on the determinants of support for pension reforms. 
The second essential overall result is that the determinants beyond pure self-interest 
contribute also to explain individual heterogeneity on labour market policy preferences and 
 
7  To consider a possible impact of personal wealth we also included a dummy-variable equal to one for 
individuals living in a self-owned house or flat. Since this variable has found to be not significant, the results are 
not reported in this paper (obtainable from the authors). 
8  Unfortunately the insider-outsider theory could not be tested for preferences on employment protection 
since data for this ALLBUS question is only available for employees. 
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that their impact is substantial. Although our information proxies do not show the expected 
sign in all cases, the willingness of accepting market-friendly labour market reforms tends to 
be higher for well-informed and well-educated respondents. The self-reported degree of 
political awareness is connected with higher support for cutting subsidies to declining 
industries as well as the reduction of social benefits. A university degree raises the probability 
of supporting both an increase in pension age and the cut of subsidies substantially as can be 
seen from the high marginal effects (15.6 percentage points for the increase of pension age 
and 13.9 for the cut of subsidies preference). However, respondents with a university degree 
are less likely to support a phasing out of employment programmes. 
Fairness preferences as well as beliefs on the role of individual effort for economic success 
emerge as further important determinants of the individual assessment of the welfare state: 
Being in favour of a distribution according to the need principle has a highly significant 
negative impact on the acceptance of benefit cuts which is the only regression where this 
particular variable has been available. The belief in individual self-responsibility is a major 
determinant for economic success. It consistently makes cuts of both social benefits in general 
and unemployment benefits in particular more acceptable. However and unexpectedly, this 
belief is also connected with less support for liberalised employment protection.  
The beliefs concerning procedural fairness have no unidirectional impact on the reform 
preferences: On the one hand, we observe that individuals who trust politicians are more 
likely to accept a cut of subsidies to declining industries and a liberalisation of employment 
protection. On the other hand, the satisfaction with the democratic system leads also to 
resistance against lower social benefits. Note that we did not have a clear theoretical sign 
expectation in this case since the perception of procedural fairness may make both the status 
quo and its change more legitimate. 
Among the other individual characteristics, the East dummy stands out: It provides strong 
support to our hypothesis that the socialisation in the former GDR has a lasting impact on 
individual labour market policy preferences.9 Since we control for self-interest related 
variables like age, unemployment or income, for economic beliefs and several socio-
economic factors, our east dummy isolates the particular impact of the past regime difference 
on policy preferences. The size of the GDR effects is large; the marginal effect reaches 10.0 
 
9  The different economic performance of the Eastern and the Western part of Germany since 
reunification may reinforce the existence of systematically different attitudes toward labour market policies. 
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percentage points for rejecting cuts in social benefits and even 12.2 percentage points for 
rejecting a higher pension age and is also sizable for the rejection to cuts in subsidies. Among 
the personal characteristics, poor health decreases the likeliness to support an increase of the 
pension age by approximately 8 percentage points, while intrinsic work motivation is related 
to an equally high probability of supporting this reform. 
Finally, a gender gap exists for the assessment of cutting subsidies to declining industries and 
the liberalisation of employment protection. While women are more supportive for subsidies 
to declining industries they are more ready to accept a liberalised regime of employment 
protection. The latter result must be interpreted with attention to the specific question 
underlying the dependent variable in regression (6): Since this question targets more at 
individual labour market flexibility than at a policy position this gender gap could be related 
to different employment profiles of men and women on the German labour market. 
Although they influence the assessment of specific policies in some cases, the remaining 
individual characteristics do not show a robust impact. Only in one case the religion dummy 
reach significance, indicating a particular support of religious respondents for declining 
industries. Marriage and children in the household only appear relevant for the assessment of 
a higher pension age. 
Table 3 about here 
 
5. Conclusion 
Economists tend to explain labour market reform resistance by referring to purely rational 
approaches focusing, for example, on a pattern of reform winners and losers. Our results 
indicate that this approach has empirical substance and helps to understand individual 
assessments of different reform dimensions. For example, it is indeed the case that individuals 
who have high incomes, are young and possess a safe job are more inclined to favour cuts in 
unemployment benefits than those in less favourable circumstances. Nevertheless, self-
interest is not the full story behind the strong resistance against labour market reforms. Our 
results suggest that voters’ positions are also influenced by their informative situation, by 
their beliefs on the sources of economic success or the functioning of democracy. In 
Germany, heterogeneity of views is also strongly increased by the split history of the country 
with Eastern Germans being more sceptical of liberal labour market reforms than their fellow 
nationals from the west even if individuals from both parts share a similar socio-economic 
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profile. Our results point to one possible explanation why expert views on labour market 
differ so often from lay perceptions: resistance must not necessarily be expected from the 
reform losers only and it cannot be taken for granted that reform winners will be on the side 
of liberalising labour market reforms. Furthermore, our results may allow drawing lessons for 
a successfully selling market-oriented labour market reforms: It is not sufficient to point to the 
individual advantages of a reform. In addition, other sources of reform resistance need to be 
addressed. For example, evidence that individual labour market performance is a function of 
individual effort is helpful to foster reform acceptance and needs to be communicated. 
Finally, our results are important for the possible impact of a macroeconomic shock on the 
acceptance of market-oriented labour market reforms. While the general reform literature is 
optimistic that crisis fosters the acceptance for reforms (Pitlik and Wirth, 2003), for labour 
market reforms less optimism is warranted. With a cyclical increase of unemployment an 
increasing number of voters is faced with the risk of dismissal and will, therefore, have an 
increasing interest in a comfortable level of unemployment benefits and protection or 
subsidies from a pure self-interest perspective. Beyond self-interest, a cyclical downturn 
caused by an external shock such as the global financial crisis has an additional reform 
impeding effect: The additional unemployment is the clear consequence of an external event 
not in the responsibility of employees. This in turn reduces the support for reforms which 
target at increasing individual effort, e.g., through stronger job search incentives. From these 
considerations we would forecast that the financial and economic crisis may have closed the 
window of opportunity for market oriented labour market reforms for the foreseeable future. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: Policy preference indicators 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
ALLBUS 2000 
Cutting social benefits 2874 0.1764 0.3812 
ALLBUS 2006 
Cutting unemployment benefits 1571 0.1808 0.3850 
Increase of pension age 1295 0.2672 0.4427 
Cutting subsidies to declining industries 1547 0.2217 0.4155 
Phasing out employment programmes 1549 0.1588 0.3656 
Liberalising employment protection  879 0.7224 0.4481 
Data definition and source see Appendix, Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Econometric Results 
 
 
 
(1) 
ALLBUS 2000 
(2) 
ALLBUS 2006 
Role of Government 
(3) 
ALLBUS 2006 
Work Orientation 
(4) 
ALLBUS 2006 
Role of Government 
(5) 
ALLBUS 2006 
Role of Government 
(6) 
ALLBUS 2006 
Work Orientation 
 Cutting social benefits Cutting unemployment benefits Increase of pension age 
Cutting subsidies to declining 
industries 
Phasing out employment 
programmes 
Liberalising employment 
protection 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Self-interest 
AGE -0.0002 (-0.04) 
-0.00003 
[0.0005] 
-0.0137 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.0033 
[-0.0569]   
0.0051 
(1.54) 
0.0014 
[0.0241] 
0.0009 
(0.26) 
0.0002 
[-0.0035] 
-0.0133 
(-2.46)** 
-0.0044 
[-0.0758] 
AGE 25     -0.3093 (-1.33) -0.0849       
AGE 25-45     -0.6188 (-4.05)*** -0.1749       
AGE 45-65     -0.3943 (-2.75)*** -0.1145       
INCOME 0.0002 (3.99)*** 
0.00005 
[0.0436] 
0.0002 
(3.66)*** 
0.00006 
[0.0523] 
0.0002 
(2.07)** 
0.00005 
[0.0436] 
0.0002 
(3.78)*** 
0.00007 
[0.0611] 
0.0002 
(3.26)*** 
0.00005 
[0.0436] 
-0.00007 
(-0.88) 
-0.00002 
[-0.0175] 
INSECURE -0.4920 (-1.55) -0.0741 
-0.6082 
(-2.97)*** -0.1124 
-0.3148 
(-1.47) -0.0861 
-0.0394 
(-0.22) 0.0109 
-0.2792 
(-1.40) -0.0582 
0.2433 
(1.42) 0.0764 
UNEMPLOYED -0.5683 (-2.03)** -0.0834 
-0.4959 
(-2.15)** -0.0962 
0.1875 
(0.92) 0.0602 
0.2941 
(1.60) 0.0909 
0.0319 
(0.16) 0.0076   
PUBLIC  
SECTOR 
-0.6634 
(-2.69)*** -0.0906 
-0.3140 
(-1.26) -0.0655 
-0.4688 
(-1.72)* -0.1190 
-0.4692 
(-1.94)* -0.1077 
-0.1264 
(-0.49) -0.0281 
-0.0680 
(-0.49) -0.0229 
ENTREPRENEUR 0.2848 (1.45) 0.0651 
-0.0768 
(-0.38) -0.0181 
0.1590 
(0.71) 0.0509 
0.1380 
(0.70) 0.0408 
0.0044 
(0.44) 0.0011   
Information 
UNIVERSITY 0.0225 (0.15) 0.0045 
0.0140 
(0.10) 0.0034 
0.4645 
(3.22)*** 0.1561 
0.4411 
(3.38)*** 0.1387 
-0.3082 
(-2.04)** -0.0650 
0.2626 
(1.50) 0.0823 
POLITICALLY 
INFORMED 
0.1907 
(1.78)* 0.0392 
-0.0132 
(-0.13) -0.0032 
0.0305 
(0.29) 0.0093 
0.3919 
(4.09)*** 0.1118 
0.1473 
(1.47) 0.0351 
-0.1827 
(-1.57) -0.0600 
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Fairness Preferences 
NEED -0.4279 (-3.98)*** -0.0827           
Beliefs 
EFFORT 0.2533 (2.39)** 0.0493 
0.3163 
(2.92)*** 0.0732 
0.0053 
(0.05) 0.0016 
0.0861 
(0.85) 0.0240 
0.1250 
(1.18) 0.0290 
-0.2220 
(-1.83)* -0.0722 
BACKGROUND -0.1600 (-1.55) -0.0325           
PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS 
-0.2109 
(-1.78)* -0.0443 
0.0823 
(0.68) 0.0205 
-0.0815 
(-0.61) -0.0243 
0.3996 
(3.39)*** 0.1237 
0.1259 
(1.00) 0.0310 
0.3138 
(2.04)** 0.0976 
Other 
SICK     -0.2856 (-1.84)* -0.0804       
EAST -0.5340 (-3.88)*** -0.0998 
-0.1955 
(-1.54) -0.0468 
-0.4137 
(-3.32)*** -0.1224 
-0.2232 
(-1.79)* -0.0618 
-0.0253 
(-0.20) -0.0060 
-0.0213 
(-0.15) -0.0071 
RELIGION 0.2029 (1.48) 0.0389 
0.0733 
(0.60) 0.0177 
-0.1795 
(-1.52) -0.0552 
-0.4824 
(-4.14)*** -0.1412 
-0.0505 
(-0.42) -0.0120 
-0.0981 
(-0.72) -0.0323 
FEMALE -0.0078 (-0.07) -0.0016 
0.0324 
(0.31) 0.0079 
0.0428 
(0.39) 0.0130 
-0.1393 
(-1.38)* -0.0391 
-0.1068 
(-1.01) -0.0252 
0.2948 
(2.33)** 0.0974 
MARRIED 0.0211 (0.17) 0.0042 
0.0116 
(0.10) 0.0028 
0.2309 
(1.93)* 0.0696 
0.0004 
(0.00) 0.0001 
0.0985 
(0.84) 0.0231 
-0.0011 
(-0.01) -0.0004 
CHILDREN 0.0372 (0.26) 0.0073 
-0.0622 
(-0.49) -0.0153 
-0.2505 
(-1.93)* -0.0791 
-0.0227 
(-0.18) -0.0064 
-0.2005 
(-1.57) -0.0493 
-0.0466 
(-0.32) -0.0007 
INTRINSIC WORK 
MOTIVATION     
0.3104 
(2.68)*** 0.0898     
0.0775 
(0.61) 0.0261 
Regression diagnostic  
p-value joint significance 
of variables 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0037  0.0003  
Observations 1093  1021  824  1017  1015  617  
Pseudo-R² 0.1412  0.0833  0.0854  0.1286  0.0376  0.0535  
*/**/*** significant at the 10/5/1 percent level. The effect of an increase of the variables AGE and INCOME by one standard deviation (2006 wave) is presented in the square brackets.
Appendix, Table 4 Variable definitions 
Variable  Unit Explanation Categories ALLBUS 
code* 
Policy preference indicator 
Cutting social 
benefits  
Dummy Cut of social benefits. 1, if the respondent approves, 
0 otherwise. 
v158 a 
Cutting 
unemployment 
benefits  
Dummy Cut of unemployment benefits. 1, if the respondent approves, 
0 otherwise. 
v641 b  
Increase of pension 
age 
Dummy Increase of pension age in order to 
solve the problems of the public 
pension system. 
1, if the respondent approves, 
0 otherwise. 
v605 c 
Cutting subsidies to 
declining industries 
Dummy Cut of subsidies to declining 
industries. 
1, if the respondent approves, 
0 otherwise. 
v633 b 
Phasing out 
employment 
programmes 
Dummy Cut financing of public 
employment programs. 
1, if the respondent approves, 
0 otherwise. 
v630 b 
Liberalising 
employment 
protection 
Dummy Liberalization of employment 
protection in order to avoid 
unemployment. 
1, if the respondent would 
accept a terminable working 
contract, 0 otherwise. 
v587 c 
Self-interest 
AGE Discrete 
variable 
Age of the respondent. 18 – 95 (94b,c) v432a, 
v27b,c 
AGE 25 Dummy Younger than 25 years. 1, for respondents aged 18 to 
24, 0 otherwise. 
v27 c 
AGE 25 – 45 Dummy Between 25 and 45 years old. 1, for respondents aged 25 to 
45, 0 otherwise. 
v27 c 
AGE 45 – 65 Dummy Between 45 and 65 years old. 1, for respondents aged 45 to 
65, 0 otherwise. 
v27 c 
INCOME Continuous 
variable 
Monthly net income of the 
respondent (in EURO).1 
0 – 12500 (8000b,c) v579a, 
v381b,c 
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 Beliefs 
Dummy  Income differences increase the 
incentive for individual effort. 
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1, if respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. 
v153a EFFORT 
Dummy Future of the people in the East 
depends on the will to work. 
1, if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. 
v495b,c 
BACKGROUND Dummy Prerequisites for social success 
and upward mobility: Right social 
background. 
1, if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. 
v145a 
INSECURE Dummy Job insecurity of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is afraid of 
becoming unemployed, 0 
otherwise. 
v481a, 
v210b,c 
UNEMPLOYED Dummy Employment status of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is currently 
unemployed, 0 otherwise. 
v462a, 
v217b,c 
Dummy Occupational position of the 
respondent: Civil servant. 
1, if the respondent is a civil 
servant, 0 otherwise. 
v463a, 
v189b,c 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
Dummy Employment in the public sector. 1, if the respondent is employed in 
the public sector, 0 otherwise. 
v206c 
ENTREPRENEUR Dummy Occupational position of the 
respondent: Entrepreneur or 
Independent Professional. 
1, if the respondent is self-
employed, 0 otherwise. 
v463a, 
v189b,c 
Information 
UNIVERSITY Dummy Respondent’s educational level. 1, if the respondent has a 
university (for applied science) 
degree, 0 otherwise. 
v457, 
v458a 
v184, 
v185b,c 
Dummy Political interest of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is (very) 
strongly interested in politics, 0 
otherwise. 
v20a 
Dummy The respondent is informed about the 
major political problems in Germany. 
1, if the respondent is informed, 0 
otherwise. 
v665b 
POLITICALLY 
INFORMED 
Dummy Respondent collects information 
about candidates before an election. 
1, if the respondent informs 
himself, 0 otherwise. 
v54c 
Fairness preferences 
NEED Dummy Decent income even without 
achievement. 
1, if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. 
v152a 
 23
Dummy Satisfaction with democracy in 
the FRG. 
1, if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. 
v17a PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS 
Dummy Politicians are interested in 
problems of common people. 
1, if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. 
v10b,c 
Other 
Dummy Origin of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is born in the 
former GDR, 0 otherwise. 
v874a  EAST 
Dummy State in which the respondent 
spent his/her youth. 
1, if the respondent spent his/her 
youth in the former GDR, 0 
otherwise. 
v37b,c 
RELIGION Dummy Religious denomination of the 
respondent. 
1, if the respondent belongs to an 
institutionalized religious 
community, 0 otherwise. 
v435a, 
v500b,c 
FEMALE Dummy Sex of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is female, 0 
otherwise. 
v434a, 
v174b,c 
MARRIED Dummy Marital Status of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is married, 0 
otherwise. 
v608a, 
v242b,c 
CHILDREN Dummy Children of the respondent. 1, if the respondent has own children, 
0 otherwise. 
v997a, 
v443b,c 
INTRINSIC WORK 
MOTIVATION 
Dummy Work although I do not need the 
money. 
1, if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. 
v536c 
SICK Dummy Respondent’s state of health. 1, if the respondent is not (very) 
healthy, 0 otherwise. 
v241b,c 
* The codes referring to questions from 2006 ALLBUS are taken from the German Codebook (see Terwey et al., 
2007), while those for the 2000 wave are from the German General Social Survey Codebook 1980-2004. 
a: ALLBUS 2000, b: ISSP Role of Government (ALLBUS 2006), c: ISSP Work Orientation (ALLBUS 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
